PINS '04: Practice and Theory of Incentives and Game Theory in Networked Systems

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PINS '04 Worskshop

Workshop chairs: Dina Katabi and Rahul Sami (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
Location: Portland, Oregon
Co-located with: Special Interest Group on Data Communication (SIGCOMM '04)
Date: September 3, 2004


1. Internet Congestion: A Laboratory Experiment, Daniel Friedman (University of California) and Bernardo Huberman (Hewlett-Packard Laboratories)

2. Experiences Applying Game Theory to System Design, Ratul Mahajan, Maya Rodrig,  David Wetherall and John Zahorjan (University of Washington)

3. Rethinking Incentives for Mobile Ad Hoc Networks,
Elgan Huang, Jon Crowcroft and Ian Wassell (University of Cambridge)

4. On the Benefits and Feasibility of Incentive Based Routing Infrastructure, Mike Afergan and John Wroclawski (Massashusetts Institute of Technology)

5. A Case for Taxation in Peer-to-Peer Streaming Broadcast, Yang-hua Chu (Carnegie Mellon University), John Chuang (University of California, Berkeley) and Hui Zhang (Carnegie Mellon University)

6. Near rationality and competitive equilibria in networked systems, Nicolas Christin, Jens Grossklags and John Chuang (University of California, Berkeley)

7. Faithfulness in Internet Algorithms
, Jeff Shneidman and David Parkes (Harvard University); Laurent Massoulie (Microsoft Research)

8. Free-Riding and Whitewashing in Peer-to-Peer Systems,
Michal Feldman, Christos Papadimitriou, Ion Stoica and John Chuang (University of California, Berkeley)