NetEcon '06: Workshop on the Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation

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NetEcon '06 Conference

Program chairs: Jeff Chase (Duke University), Nick Feamster (Georgia Tech) and Tim Roughgarden (Stanford University)
Location: Ann Arbor, Michigan
Co-located with: ACM Confererence on Electronic Commerce (EC '06)
Date: June 11, 2006

Proceedings for NetEcon 2006


1. Assessing the assumptions underlying mechanism design for the Internet, Steven Bauer, Peyman Faratin and Robert Beverly (MIT)

2. Punishment in Selfish Wireless Networks: A Game Theoretic Analysis, Dave Levin (University of Maryland, College Park)

3. Why Share in Peer-to-Peer Networks?, Lian Jian and Jeffrey MacKie-Mason (School of Information, University of Michigan)

4. Peer-to-Peer Filesharing and the Market for Digital Information Goods, Ramon Casadesus-Masanell (Harvard Business School); Andres Hervas-Drane (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona)

5. Improving Robustness of Peer-to-Peer Streaming with Incentives, Vinay Pai and Alexander E. Mohr (Stony Brook University)

6. Dandelion: Secure Cooperative Content Distribution with Robust Incentives, Michael Sirivianos, Xiaowei Yang and Stanislaw Jarecki (University of California, Irvine)

7. Rational Secret Sharing, Revisited: "I'll Tell You if You'll Tell Me", S. Dov Gordon and Jonathan Katz (University of Maryland)

8. Path Auction Games When an Agent Can Own Multiple Edges, Ye Du, Rahul Sami and Yaoyun Shi
(University of Michigan)

9. Bootstrapping the Long Tail in Peer to Peer Systems, Bernardo A. Huberman and Fang Wu (HP Labs)

10. Incentive Based Ranking Mechanisms, Rajat Bhattacharjee and Ashish Goel (Stanford University)

11. Havelaar: A Robust and Efficient Reputation System for Active Peer-to-Peer Systems, Dominik Grolimund, Luzius Meisser, Stefan Schmid and Roger Wattenhofer (Swiss Federal Institute of Technology)

12. Manipulability of PageRank under Sybil Strategies, Alice Cheng and Eric Friedman (Cornell University)