Program chairs: John Chuang (UC Berkeley) and Ramayya Krishnan (CMU)
Location: Berkeley, California, USA
Date: June 5-6, 2003
Papers:
1. Strategyproof Computing: Systems Infrastructures for Self-Interested Parties, Chaki Ng, David Parkes and Margo Seltzer (Harvard University)
2. Incentives for Cooperation in Peer-to-Peer Networks, Kevin Lai, Michal Feldman, Ion Stoica and John Chuang
(University of California, Berkeley)
3. To Share or Not to Share: An Analysis of Incentives to Contribute in Collaborative File Sharing Environments, Kavitha Ranganathan, Matei Ripeanu and Ankur Sarin (University of Chicago); Ian Foster (University of Chicago and Argonne National Laboratory)
4. Reputation in P2P Anonymity Systems, Roger Dingledine and Nick Mathewson (The Free Haven Project); Paul Syverson (Naval Research Lab)
5. Trading in Trust, Tokens, and Stamps, Tim Moreton and Andrew Twigg (Cambridge University)
6. Balances of Power on eBay: Peers or Unequals?, Ben Gross and Alessandro Acquisiti (University of California, Berkeley)
7. Online Reputation Mechanisms: A Roadmap for Future Research, Chrysanthos Dellarocas (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) and Paul Resnick (University of Michigan)
8. The Social Cost of Sharing, Hal Varian (University of California, Berkeley)
9. Are Contributions to P2P Technical Forums Private or Public Goods? - An Empirical Investigation, Bin Gu and Sirkka Jarvenpaa (University of Texas at Austin)
10. Quantifying Disincentives in Peer-to-Peer Networks, Michal Feldman, Kevin Lai, John Chuang and Ion Stoica (University of California, Berkeley)
11. Incentives Build Robustness in BitTorrent, Bram Cohen (bitconjurer.org)
12. Priority Forwarding in Ad Hoc Networks with Self-Interested Parties, Barath Raghavan and Alex Snoeren (University of California, San Diego)
13. Pricing Networks with Selfish Routing, Richard Cole and Yevgeniy Dodis (New York University); Tim Roughgarden (Cornell University)
14. The Design of A Distributed Rating Scheme for Peer-to-peer Systems, Debojyoti Dutta (University of Southern California); Ashish Goel (Stanford University); Ramesh Govindan and Hui Zhang (University of Southern California)
15. Differentiated Admission for Peer-to-Peer Systems: Incentivizing Peers to Contribute Their Resources, H. T. Kung (Harvard University); Chun-Hsin Wu (Academia Sinica, Taiwan)
16. KARMA: A Secure Economic Framework for P2P Resource Sharing, Vivek Vishnumurthy,
Sangeeth Chandrakumar and
Emin Gun Sirer (Cornell University)
17. The Case for Service Provider Deployment of Super-Peers in Peer-to-Peer Networks, Sumeet Singh,
Sriram Ramabhadran,
Florin Baboescu and Alex Snoeren (University of California, San Diego)
18. Intelligent Club Management in Peer-to-Peer Networks, Atip Asvanund,
Sarvesh Bagla,
Munjal Kapadia,
Ramayya Krishnan,
Michael D. Smith and
Rahul Telang (CMU)
19. Strategyproof Mechanisms for Ad Hoc Network Formation, C. Jason Woodward and David Parkes (Harvard University)
20. Economic Behavior of Peer-to-Peer Storage Networks, Andrew Fuqua, Tsuen-Wan Johnny Ngan and
Dan Wallach (Rice University)
21. Economic Measures to Resist Attacks on a Peer-to-Peer Network, David Rosenthal, Mema Roussopoulos,
Petros Maniatis and
Mary Baker (Stanford University)
22. Addressing the Non-Cooperation Problem in Competitive P2P Systems, Sepandar Kamvar,
Beverly Yang and
Hector Garcia-Molina, (Stanford University)
23. Bootstrapping a Distributed Computational Economy with Peer-to-Peer Bartering, Brent Chun (Intel Research Berkeley); Yun Fu and Amin Vahdat (Duke University) |