P2PEcon '04: The Second Workshop on Economics of Peer-to-Peer Systems

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P2PEcon '04 Conference

Program chairs: Matthew Jackson (CalTech) and David C. Parkes (Harvard University)
Location: Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA
Date: June 4-5, 2004

Papers:

1. Over-contribution in discretionary databases, Mike Klaas (University of British Columbia)
(slides)

2. P2P's Impact on Recorded Music Sales, Felix Oberholzer (Harvard Business School) and Koleman Strumpf (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill)

3. CompuP2P: An Architecture for Sharing of Compute Power In Peer-to-Peer Networks With Selfish Nodes, Rohit Gupta, Arun K. Somani (Iowa State University)
(slides)

4. A Game-Theoretic Framework for Analyzing Trust-Inference Protocols, Ruggero Morselli, Jonathan Katz, Bobby Bhattacharjee (University of Maryland)
(slides)

5. A Robust Reputation System for P2P and Mobile Ad-hoc Networks, Sonja Buchegger, Jean-Yves Le Boudec
(Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne)
(slides)

6. Maximum Likelihood Estimation of Peers' Performance in P2P Networks, Zoran Despotovic and Karl Aberer
(EPFL - Swiss Federal Institute of Technology)

(slides)

7. Hidden-Action in Multi-Hop Routing, Michal Feldman and John Chuang (University of California, Berkeley)

8. Designing Incentives for Peer-to-Peer Routing, Alberto Blanc, Yi-Kai Liu and Amin Vahdat
(University of California at Berkeley)

(slides)

9. Incentives-Compatible Peer-to-Peer Multicast, Tsuen-Wan "Johnny" Ngan, Dan S. Wallach and Peter Druschel
(Rice University)
(slides)

10. Keeping Peers Honest in EigenTrust, ZoŽ Abrams, Robert McGrew and Serge Plotkin (Stanford University)
(slides)

11. Agent-based Modeling for Differentiated Admission in P2P systems Using Evolutionary Game Theory Focused on Ownership Reputation, Junseok Hwang (Seoul National University & Syracuse University) and Choong Hee Lee
(Seoul National University)
(slides)

12. Overcoming Incentive Constraints by Linking Decisions, Matthew O. Jackson (California Institute of Technology) and Hugo F. Sonnenschein (University of Chicago)

13. Farsightedly Basic Networks, Frank H. Page, Jr. (University of Alabama), Myrna H. Wooders (University of Warwick) and Samir Kamat (Wachovia Corporation)

15. Search and the The Strategic Formation of Large Networks: When and Why do We See Power Laws and Small Worlds?, Matthew O. Jackson and Brian W. Rogers (California Institute of Technology)

16. Middlemen in Peer-to-Peer Networks: Stability and Efficiency, Robert P. Gilles and Subhadip Chakrabarti (Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University); Sudipta Sarangi (Louisiana State University); Narine Badasyan (Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University)
(slides)

16. An Asymptotically Optimal Scheme for P2P File Sharing, Panayotis Antoniadis and Costas Courcoubetis (Athens University of Economics and Business) and Richard Weber (Centre for Mathematical Sciences)
(slides)

17. Optimal Pricing Policy with Recommender Systems, Dirk Bergemann and Deran Ozmen (Yale University)

18. Optimal Peer Selection in a Free-Market Peer-Resource Economy, Micah Adler (University of Massachusetts at Amherst), Rakesh Kumar & Keith Ross (Polytechnic University), Dan Rubenstein (Columbia University), David Turner (California State University) & David Yao (Columbia University)

19. SWIFT: A System With Incentives For Trading
, Karthik Tamilmani, Vinay Pai and Alexander E. Mohr (Stony Brook University)

20. SPIES: Secret Protection Incentive-based Escrow System, N. Boris Margolin, Matthew K. Wright and Brian N. Levine (University of Massachusetts at Amherst)
(slides)


21. An Incentive Mechanism for Message Relaying in Peer-to-Peer Discovery, Cuihong Li, Bin Yu and Katia Sycara (Carnegie Mellon University)
(slides)

22. Foundations of Information Aggregation Mechanisms, Eiichiro Kazumori (California Institute of Technology)